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TIPPING THE SCALE TO BRING A BALANCED 
APPROACH: EVIDENCE DISCLOSURE IN CHINESE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
Bryant Yuan Fu Yang† and Diane Chen Dai†† 
Abstract: Due to the ever-increasing trade between China and the rest of the 
world, commercial disputes have risen dramatically.  Many foreign companies choose to 
resolve these disputes through arbitration to circumvent the Chinese courts and to retain 
more autonomy and control.  Arbitration itself can also be a problem because rules and 
laws differ, depending on the jurisdiction and the institution involved.  Under China’s 
civil law tradition, arbitrators are restricted in their ability to force parties to disclose 
evidence that may be detrimental to their case.  Additionally, arbitrators have no 
authority to obtain evidence from uncooperative third parties.  This Article seeks to 
provide some guidance for parties engaged in arbitration proceedings in China. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, China became the world’s fourth largest economy. 1   On 
average, China’s economy has grown by 9.4% annually for the past twenty-
seven years,2 and it is expected to continue to grow by 7.5% until 2010.3  
China’s incredible transition to a market economy has lifted 250 million 
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their friendship and warmth.  Also, I want to thank Professor Robert Berring, Jr.  Since my sophomore year 
in college, you have been there to guide, console, and encourage me from one insane project to another, 
from Johannesburg, to Bangkok, to Beijing.  A hundred acknowledgements of this type could not begin to 
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1
 Keith Bradsher, China Reports Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2006.  In 2005, China had an economic output of USD 2.26 trillion.  Only the United States, Japan and 
Germany have larger economies. Id. 
2
 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, China’s GDP grows 
9.5% in first half (July 20, 2005), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t204319.htm (last visited Dec. 
12, 2006) (quoting Zheng Jingping from the National Bureau of Statistics). 
3
 China’s GDP growth to average 7.5% in 2006-2010, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2006. 
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people out of poverty,4 and much of this progress is the result of the Chinese 
government’s decision to open its market and resources to the outside world.  
However, as trade, investment, and general business interactions continue to 
increase, so do international and domestic commercial conflicts. 
To resolve these conflicts, many companies, both domestic and 
foreign, opt to use alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) rather than turn to 
the Chinese courts.  ADR is the preferred method of resolving disputes 
because it is consistent with Chinese cultural and historical practice. 5  
Traditionally, the Chinese have relied on an informal legal system composed 
of dispute resolution devices, using village elders and guild procedures,6 
rather than the country’s formal legal system. 7   This approach reflects 
Confucian ideals of social harmony and reconciliation, providing parties 
with a “face-saving” device and an opportunity to save business 
relationships.8  Many foreign investors and international companies prefer 
ADR because it gives them more control and autonomy9 than they would 
have in Chinese courts.  ADR provides them with an alternative to China’s 
legal system, which they perceive as biased against foreigners, opaque in 
nature, and lacking political independence.10  In addition to this perception 
of unfairness, other factors impede foreign parties from seeking remedial 
action, including the use of Mandarin during all court proceedings, the need 
for Chinese counsel, and foreigners’ unfamiliarity with China’s domestic 
laws.  Foreign investors believe arbitration is less biased and more equitable 
because it allows them to be a part of the appointment process for selecting 
an arbitrator, and because it provides other contractual rights such as the 
                                                 
4
 Callum MacLeod, Report Illustrates Huge Gap Between China’s Rich, Poor, USA TODAY, Dec. 
16, 2005.  It is important to note that there are still millions in China who are extremely poor and growth in 
wealth has been imbalanced. 
5
 See Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative 
Study, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 254-55 (1996). 
6
 William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in UNDERSTANDING 
CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 18 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003). 
7
 Id. at 16-17.  See also THE GREAT QING CODE 9-11 (William C. Jones trans., Claredon Press 
1994).  The center of the formal system was The Code (dynastic code), which was a directive to the district 
magistrate to tell him when to punish and precisely what punishment to inflict in any circumstances that 
were perceived to be legally significant.  There were no parties or lawyers; the magistrate acted with 
immediate and total control.  The proceedings tended to be harsh on all participants.  Everyone, including 
witnesses, was imprisoned and punishment was handed-out without compassion. 
8
 Graham, supra note 5. 
9
 George O. White III, Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct Investment Dispute 
Resolution in the People’s Republic of China, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 55, 68 (2003). 
10
 Id. at 71.  See also Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving 
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People's Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 
329, 333 (1997).  But see Teema Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002) (discussing, at 
length, how perceptions of the Chinese legal system are often based on stereotypes, Western biases, and 
ignorance). 
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ability to designate English as the official language for the proceedings.11  
All of these factors make ADR a more convenient and attractive method of 
dispute resolution for foreign investors.12 
Although negotiation and mediation are preferred in China, 13 
arbitration is used when these forms of dispute resolution fail.14  Today, 
arbitration is the standard method of dispute resolution in China, as well as 
the primary method of resolving international commercial disputes.15  There 
are over 180 domestic arbitration commissions in mainland China.16  In the 
last decade, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (“CIETAC”), China’s foremost international arbitration 
institution, has handled more cases than any other international arbitration 
center.17 
While there are tremendous advantages to international arbitration,18 
arbitration itself can present problems.  Arbitral procedural and substantive 
rules vary, depending on the country and the institution engaged in the 
dispute.  There is a global movement towards harmonizing arbitration law, 
but differences still exist.19  For example, evidence disclosure law differs 
markedly depending on whether the place of arbitration, lex loci arbitri,20 
lies in a common law or civil law jurisdiction. 21   The term “evidence 
disclosure” is used here rather than “discovery,” because procedural rules 
                                                 
11
 White, supra note 9, at 68. 
12
 Id. at 71. 
13
 From 1980 to 2000, there were approximately 130 million civilian cases mediated in China, five 
times the number of cases handled by the Chinese courts.  Kevin C. Clark, The Philosophical 
Underpinnings and General Workings of Chinese Mediation Systems: What Lessons Can American 
Mediators Learn?, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 117, 127 (2002). 
14
 White, supra note 9, at 67. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Eu Jin Chua, Symposium: Legal Implications of a Rising China: The Laws of the People’s 
Republic of China: An Introduction for International Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 133, 142 (2006). 
17
 Tang Houzhi, The Arbitration Road–in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Founding 
of CCPIT, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE CHINESE COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2002). 
18
 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 22-23 (4th ed. 2004). 
19
 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Symposium: International Commercial Arbitration: Globalization of 
Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1321 (2003) (“Arbitration laws are increasingly 
harmonized.  As a result, they tend to become interchangeable.  Admittedly, most of them have not yet 
reached this stage, but the overall trend is undisputable.”). 
20
 See Christopher S. Gibson, Report: Awards and Other Decisions: Articles 59 to 66, 9 AM. REV. 
INT'L ARB. 181, 185 (1998). 
21
 Although most states accommodate parties’ autonomy, the state may wish to preserve the 
“integrity of its legal order or protect the rights of non-parties.”  For this reason, “the lex arbitri governs all 
phases of arbitration . . . [P]ublic policy consideration impose mandatory requirements upon the arbitral 
tribunal and define the available judicial remedies for assisting or controlling the arbitral process.”  Saul 
Perloff, The Ties that Bind: The Limits of Autonomy and Uniformity in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L. BUS. L. 323, 329-30 (1992). 
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and practices related to evidence disclosure vary to a significant extent in 
international arbitration.22 
International arbitration must balance the concepts of fairness and 
efficiency.23  Arbitration is designed to provide a quick, efficient process of 
resolving disputes, and to serve as an alternative to drawn-out and costly 
litigation.24  Because of arbitration’s concise nature, unconstrained evidence 
disclosure powers cannot be granted to arbitrators. 25   Without adequate 
mechanisms for compelling disclosure, however, arbitrators may not gather 
all the relevant information needed to render a fair decision.26  This fear is 
especially well-founded when disputes involve parties with unequal powers 
and resources. 
This Article examines whether Chinese international arbitration 
achieves this balance and concludes that it does not in its current form.  
Additional steps must be taken to provide Chinese arbitrators with the 
discretion and authority needed to compel evidence disclosure and to ensure 
substantial justice in the arbitration process.  This Article also provides 
guidance for foreign investors and companies that seek to compel disclosure 
from an uncooperative opposing party or nonparty. 
This Article compares three aspects of evidence disclosure practice:  
party disclosure, nonparty disclosure, and pre-hearing disclosure of 
evidence. 27   As a civil law jurisdiction, China’s legal system stands in 
contrast to the United States and other common law jurisdictions in regard to 
its evidentiary disclosure law.  Whereas in most common law jurisdictions 
these mechanisms are viable and liberally granted, it is difficult to compel 
evidence disclosure in Chinese arbitration.  In some situations, it is not even 
possible. 
                                                 
22
 Redfern & Hunter, supra note 18, at 299 (“Indeed, it is better to avoid the use of the term 
‘discover’ because it is an ambiguous term.  To a civil lawyer, it means nothing; to a U.S. lawyer it 
encompasses production of documents and depositions of potential witness and experts as well as 
inspection of the subject-matter of the dispute; to an English lawyer it refers only to the production of 
documents.”). 
23
 Eric A. Schwartz, Reconciling Speed with Justice in International Arbitration, in IMPROVING 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR SPEED AND TRUST 44, 44 (Benjamin G. Davis ed., 1998). 
24
 See John C. Koski, From Hide-And-Seek to Show-And-Tell: Evidentiary Disclosure Rules, 17 AM. 
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 497, 497 (1993) (stating that discovery increases the duration and cost of litigation). 
25
 Redfern & Hunter, supra note 18, at 300 (“Wholesale disclosure of documents is an expensive and 
time-consuming process for all concerned and rarely reveals the ‘smoking gun’ that is being sought.”). 
26
 See Gabriel Herrmann, Note, Discovering Policy Under The Federal Arbitration Act, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 779, 802-03 (2003). 
27
 This Article limits itself to these three areas for organizational and clarity purposes.  There is an 
array of topics that could be discussed on the issue of evidence disclosure in international arbitration, such 
as on-site evidence collection or expert testimony.  However, this Article was written as an in-depth 
analysis of a few issues, rather than a broad scan of the topic. 
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Part I describes CIETAC, its institutional rules, and the Chinese 
Arbitration Law to provide background to international arbitration in China.  
Part II compares CIETAC arbitrators’ lack of authority to compel disclosure 
from parties with the authority of other international arbitration institutions, 
and suggests potential avenues for recourse.  Part III highlights the lack of 
power arbitrators have over nonparties in China, while simultaneously 
showing that CIETAC can exert some influence over nonparties to 
encourage disclosure.  Part IV explores pre-hearing evidence disclosure 
proceedings.  Part V concludes by providing several steps that parties can 
take to achieve their preferred levels of evidentiary disclosure during their 
arbitrations in China. 
II. BACKGROUND: CIETAC AND THE CHINESE ARBITRATION LAW 
International arbitration is a “hybrid” of private and public law28 
because “[i]t begins as a private agreement between the parties . . . [y]et it 
ends with an award that has binding legal force.”29  Any arbitration thus has 
two distinct legal orders or systems.  One is imposed by the contract 
between the parties, and the other is set by an external order.30  Because 
arbitration is governed both by a private agreement between the parties and 
national law, it is crucial to look at two sets of authority when examining 
issues in international arbitration:  institutional rules and national laws 
pertaining to arbitration.  Institutional rules are more important in China than 
in other jurisdictions because China permits only institutional arbitration; ad 
hoc arbitration does not exist. 31   In addition, the process of evidence 
collection is usually administered according to the rules of the governing 
institute, which is designated by the parties through their contractual 
agreement to arbitrate.32 
International arbitration in China cannot be discussed without some 
background information on CIETAC.  In 1956, CIETAC was created “to 
                                                 
28
 Redfern & Hunter, supra note 18, at 11. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Perloff, supra note 21, at 327. 
31
 Eu Jin Chua, supra note 16, at 141.  Chinese law does not make any reference to ad hoc 
arbitration.  However, under Chinese law, if an arbitration agreement does not specify an arbitration 
commission, it is void.  International arbitration can be both ad hoc and institutional.  In an ad hoc 
arbitration, the arbitrator or tribunal selected by the parties is responsible for all administrative matters 
associated with the arbitration process, such as setting the procedural rules, collecting the fees, and 
arranging the hearing.  In institutional arbitration, an entity provides these services.  Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa 
A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the Global Economy, 31 DAYTON L. 
REV. 421, 435 (2006). 
32
 W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Contours of Arbitration Discovery, 67 ALA. LAW. 280, 
283 (2006). 
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resolve foreign trade disputes relating to ‘contracts, agreements, and/or other 
documents between disputing parties.’”33  In fact, CIETAC was the only 
organization authorized to resolve commercial disputes between Chinese 
and foreign parties prior to 1996.34   Because other domestic arbitration 
commissions have been established to hear domestic disputes,35 and many 
other local institutions are gaining recognition as suitable places to 
adjudicate international commercial disputes, CIETAC is no longer the only 
forum for resolution through arbitration.36  Nonetheless, CIETAC remains 
the main Chinese international arbitration commission. 37   CIETAC’s 
headquarters are in Beijing, and its sub-commissions are in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, along with nineteen other liaison offices around the nation.38  In 
2005, it took 979 cases, of which it settled 958,39  earning CIETAC the 
distinction of having the highest caseload of any arbitration institution in the 
world.40 
Although CIETAC has gained an international reputation for fairness 
and impartiality,41 and its awards have been enforced in over 140 countries 
and regions,42 it is also criticized for its lack of transparency, perceived bias 
against foreign parties, and overly expensive and time-consuming process.43  
In response to these criticisms, CIETAC amended its arbitration rules in 
2005, addressing such pertinent issues as the arbitrator selection process and 
the efficiency of the tribunal.44 
                                                 
33
 Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New 
Developments, and Current Practice, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 540 (1995). 
34
 Eu Jin Chua, supra note 16, at 142. See also White, supra note 9, at 68. 
35
 Eu Jin Chua, supra note 16, at 142. 
36
 Id. at 142-43. 
37
 Id. at 143. 
38
 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, http://www.cietac.org.cn/ 
english/introduction/intro_1.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
39
 CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 50TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION 173 (2006). 
40
 Darren Fitzgerald, CIETAC's New Arbitration Rules: Do the Reforms Go Far Enough?, ASIAN 
DISP. REV., July 2005, at 51. 
41
 Walter J. Duffy Jr. & Roger Hopkins, Peeking over the Great Wall, LEGAL UPDATES,  May 2004, 
at 5; Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 450 (stating that Chinese arbitration law and practices 
are generally in agreement with international arbitration practices). 
42
 Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 426. 
43
 See Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2005, at 31; 
William Heye, Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China–Chinese Courts vs. 
CIETAC, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 553 (2004).  But see Benjamin O. Kostrzewa, 
Comment, China International Economic Trade Arbitration in 2006: New Rules, Same Results?, 15 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y 519, 530-31 (2006) (citing an American Chamber of Commerce survey of American 
companies that found CIETAC and arbitration in China to be fair and efficient, and that companies who 
had no arbitration experience in China have a negative view of arbitration in China). 
44
 Kostrzewa, supra note 43, at 520. 
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The CIETAC International Arbitration Rules of 2005 (“CIETAC 2005 
Rules”) provide only half of the procedural framework for evidence 
disclosure.  The other half is provided by the Arbitration Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (“CAL”), which is the primary law regulating arbitration 
in China.45  CAL was adopted and promulgated in 1994.46  It was influenced 
by international arbitration legislation and practices outside of China, 
especially the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration.47  In eighty separate articles, CAL prescribes the mandatory 
provisions that CIETAC, and all other arbitration institutions, must follow.48  
CAL, as the lex loci arbitri, generally governs all phases of international 
arbitration in China.  CIETAC rules may provide more specific standards as 
long as they do not conflict with CAL.49 
III. COMPELLING PARTIES TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE 
A. Arbitrators Cannot Compel Parties to Disclose Evidence 
Unfortunately for parties seeking to obtain evidence from an opposing 
party in the course of arbitration, international arbitrators in China lack the 
authority to compel unwilling parties to make such disclosures.  Unlike the 
disclosure provisions contained in other institutional rules, the CIETAC 
2005 Rules do not explicitly grant arbitrators the right to compel a party to 
disclose evidence.  Only CIETAC Articles 37 and 38 provide a framework 
that arbitrators can use to deal with situations in which one party wants the 
other to produce evidence.  Article 38 has stronger language than Article 37, 
granting arbitrators the power to “request” the delivery of “relevant 
materials, documents, or property and goods for checking, inspection and/or 
                                                 
45
 Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 427. 
46
 Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, 
effective Sept. 1, 1995) translated in China Int’l Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Website, 
http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/laws/laws_5.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter CAL]. 
47
 Zhao Xiuwen & Kloppenberg, supra note 31, at 428. 
48
 See CAL supra note 46.  Article 79 of CAL provides that “[t]he arbitration organization set up in 
cities where the people’s governments of the municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions are located 
and other cities which have districts shall be reorganized according to the relevant provisions of this law.  
Those not reorganized shall be terminated in one year’s time starting from the date of the implementation 
of this law.  Other arbitration organizations set up before the implementation of this law and are not in 
conformity to the provisions of this law shall be terminated starting from the date of the implementation of 
this law.”  CAL, supra note 46, art. 79. 
49
 Perloff, supra note 21, at 329-30. 
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appraisal” to a tribunal-appointed expert. 50   The article states that “the 
parties shall be obliged to comply.”51  Article 37 of the CIETAC 2005 Rules 
permits an arbitrator to “undertake investigations and collect evidence as it 
considers necessary” on its own initiative.52 
Article 38 deals with expert witnesses and thus falls outside the scope 
of this piece.  Although Article 38 requires parties to comply with an 
investigation conducted by an expert, it does not provide sanctioning 
powers.  Further, the CIETAC 2005 Rules do not allow arbitrators to use 
Chinese courts to help gather evidence or to sanction parties for not 
complying with orders by the arbitrator.  Despite the strong wording in 
Article 38, it still does not grant parties or arbitrators any real power to 
compel evidence disclosure. 
In contrast to Article 38, Article 37 is worded more broadly.  The 
article can be interpreted as giving arbitrators the authority to “investigat[e] 
and collect evidence” in a party’s possession.  However, the lack of explicit 
language more likely denies arbitrators the authority to compel parties to 
disclose evidence.53  First, Article 37 is not often used to obtain evidence in 
arbitral proceedings; rather, arbitrators depend heavily on the evidence 
submitted by the parties.54  Second, when a party actually petitions for the 
use of the article in order to compel the production of evidence,55 arbitrators 
use the article’s authority to conduct independent investigations, including 
site visits and interviews of witnesses and employees, and to hire experts, 
but not to force parties to disclose information or documents.56  Thus, no 
article exists in the CIETAC 2005 Rules that can be used to compel a party 
to disclose evidence that may be detrimental to its case. 
                                                 
50
 CIETAC International Arbitration Rules of 2005, art. 38 (Adopted by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade and the China Chamber of International Commerce on Jan. 11, 2005, 
effective May 1, 2005) [hereinafter CIETAC 2005 Rules]. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. art. 37. 
53
 Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 41 (stating that “[d]iscovery basically does not exist.  You are 
largely limited to supplying documentary evidence to support your own claim and to refute the 
complaint.”). 
54
 Interview with Guo Huaning, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing China (Nov. 10, 2006) (on file with 
Journal) [hereinafter Guo Interview].  She stated:  “Usually, the parties are responsible for their cases.  If 
they say party B has that evidence, then they will try to find other supporting evidence. . . . Normally, 
arbitrators check evidence submitted by the parties and [do] not use [A]rticle 37.”  However, one arbitrator 
did believe that “arbitrators use this rule frequently.”  Email Interview with Helen Shi, CIETAC Arbitrator 
(Nov. 26, 2006) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Shi Interview]. 
55
 Interview with Wang Yingmin, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing China (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with 
Journal) [hereinafter Wang Interview].  He said:  “In my experience, the tribunal rarely take[s] up 
investigation.  Normally one party applies or asks the tribunal to investigate.  They censor or check the 
evidence and then decide whether to investigate.” 
56
 Interview with Jia Shen, CIETAC Secretariat, Beijing, China (Nov. 28, 2006) (on file with 
Journal) [hereinafter Jia Interview]. 
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Further, CAL is almost identical to the CIETAC 2005 Rules regarding 
evidence collection and disclosure.  Article 43 of CAL, like Article 37 of the 
CIETAC 2005 Rules, states that “[a]n arbitration tribunal may collect on its 
own evidence it considers necessary.”57  None of the other CAL provisions 
provide arbitrators with sanctioning powers or the ability to turn to the 
Chinese courts if a party refuses to disclose the evidence in its possession. 
A recent case illustrates some of the drawbacks created by arbitrators’ 
lack of power to compel disclosure of evidence.  The case involved the sale 
of two complex machine presses by an American company to a Chinese 
company.58  The buyer brought the dispute into arbitration, accusing the 
seller of delivering non-conforming goods.59  The claimant hoped to regain 
all payments previously made and to return the machines.60  However, in the 
course of arbitration, the seller discovered that the buyer had been using one 
of the machines without any complications.61   If the arbitrators had the 
power to compel the buyer to testify or produce documents that could verify 
they were using one of the machines, the respondent could have been able to 
obtain a dismissal for half of the claims against it.62  The lack of power to 
compel evidence disclosure forced the seller to rely solely on its own records 
and testimony that the machines were conforming, forcing the arbitral 
tribunal to determine its award based on their perception of the parties’ 
trustworthiness. 
Because there are no express provisions that deal with compelling 
evidence disclosure in either the CIETAC 2005 Rules or in CAL, arbitrators 
and parties are effectively deprived of the ability to compel evidence 
disclosure from a non-consenting party.  Articles 37 and 38 of the 2005 
CIETAC Rules and Article 43 of CAL are the only pertinent provisions 
related to obtaining evidence from a reluctant party.  None of these 
provisions grant arbitrators explicit sanctioning powers to penalize parties 
for refusing to disclose evidence.  This leaves parties with little or no 
recourse when a party refuses to disclose important evidence. 
                                                 
57
 CAL, supra note 46, art. 43. 
58
 CIETAC Arbitration Case, Beijing, China (Oct. 19, 2006).  Out of confidentiality, the parties’ 
names, along with any form of information that could be used to identify the parties, have been withheld. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
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B. Civil Law Systems Generally Lack Mechanisms for Compelling 
Evidence Disclosure 
Arbitrators in other civil law jurisdictions also lack the authority to 
compel evidence disclosure.  In Germany, for example, there is a legal 
framework for forced evidence disclosure.  While the Arbitration Rules of 
the German Arbitration Institute (“DIS Rules”) permit arbitrators to “order 
the production of documents,”63  the German Arbitration Law64 is nearly 
silent on the powers of arbitrators to collect evidence.  It stipulates only that 
“failing an agreement by the parties, and in the absence of provisions in this 
[law], the arbitral tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such manner as it 
considers appropriate . . . to determine the admissibility of evidence, admit 
evidence and freely access such evidence.”65  The German Arbitration Law 
does, however, allow the tribunal to request court assistance in taking 
evidence and performing other judicial acts which the arbitrator is not 
empowered to carry out.66  The arbitrators are “entitled to participate in any 
judicial taking of evidence and to ask questions.” 67   Thus, German 
arbitrators can indirectly use the German Code on Civil Procedure, which 
permits courts to order the production of adverse evidence. 
While some authority is granted to German arbitrators to compel 
evidence disclosure, that authority is severely restricted.  Arbitrators do not 
have any explicit authority to compel parties to take testimonies under 
oath.68  In addition, parties can only be compelled to produce documents that 
were previously referred to by one of the parties.69  Because past practices of 
the German courts indicate they did not historically compel evidence 
                                                 
63
 German Arbitration Institute Arbitration Rules, art. 27.1 [hereinafter DIS Rules]. 
64
 Act on the Reform of the Law relating to Arbitral Proceedings, Dec. 22, 1997, BGBl. I at 3224, 
available at www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared_files/lagar/tyska_lagen_om_skiljedom_eng.pdf (F.R.G.) 
[hereinafter GAL]. 
65
 Id. § 1042(4). 
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disclosure, German arbitrators may also be reluctant to use all of the 
methods permitted for evidence collection.70 
France, another civil law jurisdiction, also limits arbitrators’ ability to 
collect evidence from the parties.  French arbitration laws and institutional 
rules are written in broad terms like the CIETAC 2005 Rules and CAL.  The 
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules (“ICC Rules”) state 
that, “[a]t any time during the proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may 
summon any party to provide additional evidence.”71  Similarly, the French 
Arbitration Law in the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile (New Code of 
Civil Procedure) (“N.C.P.C.”) permits arbitrators to “enjoin” a party to 
produce an item of evidence.72  However, neither the ICC Rules nor the 
N.C.P.C. allows arbitrators to compel parties to produce evidence, and 
arbitrators do not have a way to sanction parties who do not comply with 
their decisions or requests. 73   Furthermore, because of the lack of any 
permissive language granting arbitrators the authority to compel evidence 
disclosure in the N.C.P.C., the tribunal cannot petition French courts to help 
collect evidence from uncooperative parties.74 
In Germany and France, both the institutional rules and the 
jurisdictional law on international arbitration are similar to those in China.  
French international arbitrators do not have the power to impose sanctions 
against parties who refuse to disclose evidence mandated by the arbitral 
tribunal, and parties seeking disclosure may not turn to the French courts for 
help.  Although parties in Germany may seek help from German courts 
outside of the arbitration process, this practice is severely restricted and 
rarely used.  These jurisdictions reflect the civil law tradition of refusing to 
require “discovery” or a wide range of evidence disclosure. 
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 Perloff, supra note 21, at 349.  Although correct in its assessment that production cannot be 
compelled, Perloff is incorrect in interpreting that N.C.P.C. Article 11(2) is applicable to arbitration.  Id.  
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C. Disclosure Rules in Common Law Jurisdictions Provide a Sharp 
Contrast to Rules in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Compared to the civil law system, common law jurisdictions generally 
permit arbitral tribunals to order a party to produce evidence.  In England, 
both institutional rules and arbitration laws grant wide powers to arbitrators 
to collect evidence from parties.  Arbitrators can compel parties to produce 
documents and to testify under oath.  The London Center for International 
Arbitration (“LCIA”) grants arbitrators the power to force a party to disclose 
information.  Under Article 22.1 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, arbitrators 
can order any party to make “any property, site or thing under its control and 
relating to . . . the arbitration available for inspection by the Arbitral 
Tribunal.”75  The LCIA Arbitration Rules also empower arbitrators “to order 
any party to produce to the Arbitral Tribunal, and to the other parties for 
inspection . . . any documents or classes of documents in their possession.”76  
Similarly, the English Arbitration Act permits arbitrators to direct a party to 
testify under oath and to make any property relating to the arbitration 
available for inspection, photographing, preservation, custody, or 
detention.77  Additionally, under the English Arbitration Act, arbitrators may 
order parties to disclose documents.78 
Like England, Singapore grants wide powers to arbitrators to collect 
evidence from parties through its institutional rules and arbitrational laws.  
The Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(“SIAC Rules”) expressly allow arbitrators to “order any party to produce to 
the Tribunal, and to the other parties for inspection . . . any documents or 
class of documents in their possession or power which the Tribunal 
determines to be relevant.”79  In addition to granting many other powers,80 
the SIAC Rules also permit arbitrators to “make orders or give directions to 
any party for interrogatories.” 81   Like the SIAC Rules, the Singapore 
Arbitration Act grants arbitrators the power to order parties to produce 
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 London Centre for International Arbitration Rules, art. 22.1(d) [hereinafter LCIA Rules]. 
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 Id. art. 22.1(e). 
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documents, answer interrogatories, give evidence by affidavit, and testify 
under oath.82 
Similarly, the American Arbitration Association Rules (“AAA Rules”) 
give arbitrators broad powers to collect evidence. 83   The AAA Rules 
expressly permit arbitrators to compel parties to produce “other documents, 
exhibits, or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate” at any time 
during the arbitral proceedings.84  Chiarella v. Viscount Industries Co., Ltd.85 
illustrates the expansive powers of arbitrators under the AAA Rules.  In 
Chiarella, the district court rejected a plea to vacate the award by the 
plaintiff, who argued that the arbitrator had exceeded its authority by 
ordering full discovery, an in camera inspection of allegedly privileged 
documents, and an explanation, document-by-document, of the basis of the 
claimed privilege. 86   The court held that the AAA Rules “confer on 
arbitrators broad powers to ensure that evidence is presented at arbitration 
hearings in such a manner as to ensure that legal and factual issues are 
sufficiently developed.” 87   The court rejected the plaintiff’s plea on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to show that such authority was not 
within the arbitrator’s powers.88 
In addition to the AAA Rules, Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) authorizes arbitrators to compel parties to disclose evidence.  
Under Section 7, arbitral tribunals in the United States “may summon in 
writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a 
proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper 
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.”89  The courts have 
interpreted “any person” to include parties involved in the arbitration, as 
well as nonparties.90  Parties can be held in contempt of court if they do not 
abide by the arbitral tribunal’s order to disclose evidence.91 
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 Paul D. Friedland & Lucy Martinez , Arbitral Subpoenas under U.S. Law and Practice, 14 AM. 
REV. INT'L ARB. 197, 201 (2003).  Although the article’s analysis is on Article 31(d) of the Commercial 
Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas Arbitration Rules, its analysis is important nonetheless 
because the language and scope of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Rules on international 
arbitration are similar to Article 31(d). 
84
 International Dispute Resolution Procedures (Including Mediation and Arbitration), art. 19(3) 
(amended and effective Sept. 1, 2007).  
85
 No. 92 Civ. 9310 (RPP), 1993 WL 497967 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993). 
86
 Id. at *1-2. 
87
 Id. at *4. 
88
 Id. 
89
 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
90
 Friedland & Martinez, supra note 83, at 202. 
91
 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
54 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 1 
 
 
England, Singapore, and the United States provide examples of 
common law jurisdictions that permit forced evidence disclosure.  In all 
three jurisdictions, express rules and regulations grant arbitrators the broad 
power to compel parties to disclose evidence, to testify under oath, and to 
answer interrogatories. 
D. Alternative Methods Are Available to Arbitrators and Parties to 
Compel Evidence Disclosure 
Neither CAL nor the CIETAC 2005 Rules grant arbitrators or parties 
any authority to compel evidence disclosure.  However, there are ways to 
circumvent these obstacles.  Arbitrators may draw an adverse inference from 
a party’s decision to not cooperate with the arbitral tribunal’s request to 
disclose evidence.  A party thus risks losing credibility and weakening its 
case by its refusal to comply with a disclosure request.  A party may also ask 
a Chinese court to preserve evidence in the hands of an opposing party.  The 
court will then take possession of the evidence, which is made available to 
the arbitrators for examination. 
1. Arbitrators May Draw an Adverse Inference from a Party’s Refusal to 
Comply with a Disclosure Request 
Despite the apparent lack of options, arbitrators and parties can utilize 
a few alternative practices to compel evidence disclosure in Chinese 
international arbitration proceedings.  The most convenient and pragmatic 
step is for arbitrators to “draw an adverse inference” from a party’s inability 
or unwillingness to produce the evidence.92  Professor Martin Hunter, an 
experienced arbitrator, defines this process succinctly: 
[T]he arbitrator may usually “draw an adverse inference”—
namely, if he believes that the document(s), witness(es) or 
information is in existence and could have been supplied, he 
will make the assumption that the missing material would be 
adverse to the relevant party’s interest.93 
CIETAC arbitrators regularly draw adverse inferences when parties hide 
damaging evidence, despite being asked by the tribunal to produce it for 
inspection.94 
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 Email from Martin Hunter, Professor of International Dispute Resolution, Nottingham Law 
School, Nottingham Trent University, to authors (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Hunter 
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A party’s refusal to disclose evidence without justification can also 
influence the outcome of the award.95  Kou Liyun, a CIETAC arbitrator, 
stated, “[i]t really happens in practice and . . . it will put the said party at a 
serious disadvantage, i.e. the final award may be in favor of the other 
party.”96  Arbitration scholars criticize the adverse inference alternative as 
inefficient and too lenient.97  Nonetheless, arbitrators are authorized to draw 
adverse inferences, so parties have an incentive to comply with disclosure 
requests. 98   The party will have “to determine which is worse—the 
production of documents injurious to its case or the inferences that the 
arbitrators may draw.”99  Thus, parties in Chinese arbitration may rely on the 
arbitrators’ ability to draw adverse inferences to encourage compliance.  
Chinese arbitrators may not be able to compel evidence disclosure through 
sanctions, but this alternative puts substantial pressure on the non-consenting 
party to cooperate. 
2. Evidence Preservation May Be Used to Compel Evidence Disclosure 
Parties can also force their opponents to disclose through the process 
of “evidence preservation,” which is permitted under Article 18 of the 
CIETAC 2005 Rules and Article 68 of the CAL.  Article 18 states that when 
a party applies for the preservation of evidence, CIETAC will forward the 
application “to the competent court at the place where the evidence is 
located.”100  Article 68 specifies that in international arbitration proceedings, 
the competent court is the Intermediate People’s Court where the evidence is 
located.101  A party can apply for evidence preservation whenever it fears 
that “the evidence might be destroyed or if it would be difficult to obtain the 
evidence later on.”102  Usually, a party submits an application for evidence 
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protection to the CIETAC Secretariat, who then sends the application to the 
local court on behalf of the party, providing the party’s contact 
information.103  The process is relatively quick and easy.  When court fees 
are fully paid, a party may get evidence preserved within one or two days.104  
Court fees are calculated based on the amount in dispute.105  The evidence, 
however, must be “connected with the case,” and it also must belong to the 
opposing party.106 
Evidence preservation is not identical to forced disclosure.107  For 
example, the courts cannot force a party to comply with evidence 
preservation.  For the court to intervene and preserve the evidence, the 
requesting party must provide specific details about the location of the 
evidence, its importance to the case, and its physical description. 108  
Furthermore, if the court cannot locate the evidence because of vague 
descriptions, or because it has been concealed, the court will not take any 
further investigatory action.109  In contrast, forced disclosure, as practiced in 
common law jurisdictions, requires parties to comply with the arbitral 
tribunal’s orders.  Often requiring only that the evidence be related to the 
arbitration, requests for evidence disclosure may be broad in comparison to 
the specificity required for evidence preservation. 
Despite these differences, parties can theoretically use evidence 
preservation to circumvent the lack of compelled disclosure mechanisms 
within Chinese international arbitration.  Upon receipt of a request to 
preserve evidence, court officers retrieve the listed evidence and place it 
under court supervision.110  No one can take possession of the evidence once 
it is under the court’s supervision, but the tribunal sometimes examines the 
evidence.111  Only after the dispute in arbitration is settled will the court 
release the evidence to its rightful owner.112  An opposing party can, thus, 
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petition the courts to “preserve” the evidence from a party in order for the 
tribunal to analyze the evidence. 
Parties frequently use Article 68 of CAL in arbitration proceedings.  
Ms. Guo Huaning, a Secretariat of CIETAC, has witnessed many situations 
when the “preservation of evidence” successfully led to reconciliation and 
settlement.113  In her experience, claimants commonly submit requests under 
Article 68 simultaneously with the arbitration application.114  She describes 
it as a “kind of pressure” and gives an example of a case where the court 
took account books for preservation and the tribunal was permitted to 
inspect the books.115 
Preservation of evidence can, therefore, serve as an indirect method of 
compelled disclosure in Chinese arbitration, because the evidence is taken 
under the auspices of the court and the tribunal is free to inspect and use it in 
their consideration of arbitral awards. 
IV. COMPELLING NONPARTIES TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE 
A. Forced Disclosure of Evidence Held by Nonparties Runs Contrary to 
the Chinese Legal Philosophy on Arbitration 
Whereas the CIETAC 2005 Rules briefly address the parties’ 
obligations to cooperate with the arbitration process,116 the CIETAC 2005 
Rules and CAL are completely silent on the issue of nonparties.  There is 
one provision in the CAL that relates to the collection of evidence from third 
parties.  Article 43 of the CAL states that the parties are responsible for 
producing evidence to support their claims and that the tribunal “may collect 
on its own evidence it considers necessary.”117  This statutory language does 
not grant the arbitrators any power to subpoena nonparties to testify or 
produce documents.  Furthermore, the CAL only permits the arbitral tribunal 
to petition the Chinese court for evidence preservation. 118   It does not 
empower arbitrators to ask the courts for assistance in evidence collection.  
CIETAC secretariat, Wang Yingmin, has stated “[the] Tribunal cannot do 
anything if a third party does not want to disclose.”119 
                                                 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. 
116
 CIETAC 2005 Rules, supra note 50, art. 38(2) (stating that the parties shall be “obliged to 
comply” with the tribunal’s power to request that the parties produce evidence to be examined by an expert 
or appraiser). 
117
 CAL, supra note 46, art. 43. 
118
 Id. arts. 46, 68.  
119
 Wang Interview, supra note 55. 
58 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 1 
 
 
The lack of any authority over nonparties may derive from Chinese 
legal philosophy and history.  As previously stated, the Chinese legal system 
was historically an authoritarian imperial system that tended to be harsh on 
all participants, including witnesses.120  Sometimes, witnesses themselves 
were imprisoned or punished.121  Thus, a culture emerged that stressed the 
maintenance of good relationships with others in the community.122  Chinese 
arbitration proceedings reflect this culture today; Chinese parties tend to 
rarely rely on witness testimony, and when they do it is usually obtained 
through written statements.123  Contemporary legal philosophy characterizes 
arbitration as “a closed box” containing only the two parties that had 
consented to the arbitration agreement; others cannot be “pulled” into this 
arbitration box. 124   Additionally, nonparties may not want to disrupt 
relationships that they have with both parties involved in the dispute.125  
Chinese international arbitration stresses the contractual nature of 
arbitration, believing that the act of binding a nonparty to arbitration 
proceedings is an injustice and an infringement of the nonparty’s rights.126  
This is why arbitrators are not permitted to compel nonparties to cooperate 
in arbitration proceedings, including the disclosure of evidence. 
B. Civil Law Jurisdictions Generally Do Not Grant Arbitrators Authority 
over Nonparties 
As reflected in Chinese international arbitration practices, civil law 
jurisdictions generally do not grant arbitrators authority over nonparties.  In 
Germany, although an arbitral tribunal has no authority to compel a nonparty 
to attend a hearing, to give testimony, or to disclose documents, the German 
Arbitration Law Section 1050 permits the parties to petition the German 
civil courts to help arbitrators with evidence collection.127  In the absence of 
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an asserted legal privilege, the German Civil Code of Procedure 
(Zivilprozeβordnung) (“ZPO”) allows the courts to compel a witness to 
appear and testify.128  The courts may also order a nonparty to disclose 
documents.129  However, Article 142 of the ZPO affords nonparties some 
protection; it provides that “[t]hird parties are under no obligation to produce 
the documents if the production cannot reasonably be required from them or 
if the information is privileged.”130 
In comparison, under France’s N.C.P.C. “the arbitrator cannot address 
a request to [a] non-party.”131  The articles relating to arbitration in France 
make almost no mention of nonparties, except to provide that they cannot be 
forced to testify under oath.132  In fact, the articles relating to arbitration 
expressly reject incorporation of N.C.P.C. Article 11(2), which permits a 
court to order any person to produce evidence.133  Thus, nonparties cannot be 
compelled to testify before the arbitral tribunal or to produce any documents.  
In addition, as evidenced by a lack of language granting permission in the 
N.C.P.C., the tribunal cannot petition French courts to help collect 
evidence.134 
Both Germany and France exemplify how civil law traditions are 
crippling to the ability of courts and tribunals to exercise authority over non-
consenting third parties.  Generally, if a nonparty does not want to cooperate, 
the court will not compel his or her compliance. 
C. Evidence Disclosure Procedures Vary for Nonparties in Common Law 
Jurisdictions 
Common law jurisdictions sharply contrast with their civil law 
counterparts in regard to nonparty evidence disclosure.  Common law 
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countries generally permit arbitrators to compel nonparties to disclose.  In 
England, Article 38(5) of the English Arbitration Act permits the arbitral 
tribunal to direct any witness to be examined under oath.135  If a nonparty 
refuses to recognize the powers granted to arbitrators under Article 38, then 
the party seeking testimony or documents can petition the English courts136 
to compel disclosure under Article 43 of the Act.137  A party may issue a 
subpoena to a third party with permission from the arbitral tribunal. 138  
However, the range of discovery under Article 43 of the English Arbitration 
Act is narrow.139  Requests cannot be based on mere suspicion.140  Parties 
can only request documents when they have knowledge of the documents’ 
existence and can show that they are relevant to the arbitral proceedings.141 
In Singapore, the evidentiary rules for nonparty discovery in 
international arbitration are even more liberal than the English rules.  
Whereas in England the arbitral tribunal has sole authority to subpoena a 
nonparty for testimony or document production, Singapore allows any party 
to the arbitration agreement to issue a subpoena.142  This discovery power is 
restricted in two ways:  the witness must be available in Singapore and the 
nonparty cannot be made to produce documents if those documents could 
not legally be compelled for production in a trial.143 
In the United States, under Section 7 of the FAA, arbitral tribunals 
“may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as 
a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, 
document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the 
case.” 144   American courts have uniformly interpreted “any person” to 
include nonparties.145  Witnesses and nonparties, who have never entered 
into an arbitration agreement, are legally bound to appear before American 
arbitrators to provide whatever evidence they may possess that is of interest 
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to the tribunal.  A federal court may find a person in contempt for failing to 
obey the summons or subpoena from the arbitral panel.  The court may 
impose the same penalties that are available against an uncooperative 
witness in federal court.146 
Unlike the broad powers arbitrators have over nonparties during 
arbitration hearings, their authority over nonparties during pre-hearing stages 
is limited.  Though generally permissive, common law jurisdictions are split 
over the degree of power granted to arbitrators over nonparties during pre-
hearing stages.  For example, in the United States, district circuits have 
diverging views on whether arbitral tribunals have the authority to issue 
subpoenas for testimony and documents from nonparties during the pre-
hearing stages. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most liberal 
interpretation of an arbitrator’s powers under Section 7 of the FAA in 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV. 147  
Looking to the FAA for guidance on labor arbitration, the court held that 
Section 7 granted arbitrators the power to compel nonparties to produce 
documents for parties to inspect during the pre-hearing stage.148  Although 
the court refrained from determining whether Section 7 permits arbitral 
tribunals to subpoena nonparties to pre-hearing depositions, its decision 
imposed no restrictions on compelling nonparties to produce documents.149  
As long as the arbitrator deems the information relevant to the case, a 
subpoena for nonparty disclosure of documents must be enforced by the 
courts.150 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals came out on the other end of the 
spectrum.  In Hay Group, Inc. v. EBS Acquisition Corp.,151 the court held 
that pre-hearing discovery on nonparties is prohibited in arbitration.152  The 
nonparty appellants sought to avoid compliance with a lower court order 
forcing them to disclose documents during the pre-hearing stage.153  Using a 
strict textual interpretation, the court held that Section 7 of the FAA only 
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grants arbitrators the ability to subpoena nonparties to depositions and the 
disclosure of documents at the actual hearing, but not before it.154  The court 
specifically rejected any “special needs circumstance” for which a nonparty 
must disclose documents prior to an arbitral hearing.155 
Two other circuits have taken a more moderate stance on FAA Section 
7.  Like the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit upheld an arbitrator’s implicit 
right to subpoena documents from a nonparty during the pre-hearing stage in 
In the Matter of Arbitration Between Security Life Insurance Company of 
America and Duncanson & Holt, Inc. 156   However, in dicta, the court 
determined that the nonparty seeking to avoid the subpoena in this case was 
“not a mere bystander pulled into this matter arbitrarily,” but a “party to the 
contract that [was at] the root of the dispute.”  Therefore, the nonparty in this 
case was “integrally related to the underlying arbitration.”157  Taking the 
court’s reasoning as a whole, a nonparty must be “integrally” related to the 
arbitration for the arbitrators to subpoena pre-hearing document 
production.158 
In Comsat Corporation v. National Science Foundation,159 the Fourth 
Circuit held that Section 7 did not grant an arbitrator the power to subpoena 
a nonparty for a pre-hearing deposition or document production “absent a 
showing of special need or hardship.”160  The court created this “special” 
circumstance exception because it believed that in complex cases, the 
efficiency of arbitration would be degraded, rather than enhanced, by 
limiting discovery. 161   It held that the plaintiff seeking to enforce the 
subpoena failed to show a special need or hardship because the plaintiff 
could obtain much of the desired information through the Freedom of 
Information Act.162  Yet, the court expressly rejected an attempt to define 
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“special need” except to say that “at a minimum, a party must demonstrate 
that the information it seeks is otherwise unavailable.”163 
England and Singapore demonstrate how common law jurisdictions 
generally allow arbitrators to exercise authority over nonparties.  However, 
even in common law jurisdictions, different evidentiary rules diverge in the 
extent to which they empower arbitrators to compel evidence disclosure by 
nonparties during the pre-arbitration stage.  Most common law jurisdictions 
agree that arbitrators’ powers to compel nonparty evidence disclosure ensure 
fair and equitable outcomes. 
D. The Institutional Status of CIETAC May Influence Nonparties to 
Cooperate and to Disclose Evidence in Their Possession 
Even in jurisdictions that do not grant arbitrators authority over 
nonparties, many arbitrators still ask nonparties to disclose evidence, 
recognizing that they have no power to enforce their request.164  In some 
situations, the nonparty complies.  In others, the party refuses to comply and 
the arbitrators must proceed with the arbitration hearing without the 
evidence.165  In China, arbitrations generally fall under the latter category. 
Although the arbitral tribunal cannot compel a nonparty to produce 
evidence, it can use CIETAC’s institutional power to persuade the nonparty 
to cooperate with the arbitration proceedings.  This is especially effective 
when the nonparty is a state entity, because Chinese culture places more 
emphasis on institutions than individuals.166  Thus, in situations where an 
individual party might not be able to get a nonparty to cooperate, an 
institution such as CIETAC might be able to persuade a party to disclose. 
A recent construction case provides an example of how CIETAC’s 
institutional leverage may influence nonparties to cooperate in the dispute 
resolution process and disclose valuable evidence they may have.167  A local 
administrative bureau (a nonparty) possessed a document that a foreign party 
needed but could not obtain directly.168  The tribunal permitted CIETAC’s 
Secretariat to issue a notice to the bureau, asking for assistance in producing 
the document. 169   The local bureau complied and made it available to 
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CIETAC. 170   This institutional leverage is potentially more common in 
Chinese international arbitration than other jurisdictions.171 
Another recent CIETAC construction case provides further example 
of institutional influence over nonparties in the arbitration process.  In that 
case, a labor company accused a construction corporation of failing to pay 
for services rendered.172   The labor company offered several documents 
signed by the construction corporation’s employee to prove that the labor 
company had properly rendered its services.  The construction corporation 
claimed that the employee who signed the documents was not authorized to 
do so and that there was no evidence that the signer was even an employee 
of the respondent.173  The arbitral tribunal utilized CIETAC and investigated 
the matter by reviewing the city’s construction archive.174   The tribunal 
found numerous instances where the same worker had signed on behalf of 
the respondent, showing that the employee was indeed authorized to sign the 
document in question.175  After this evidence was collected the respondent 
quickly settled with the claimant.176 
Thus, Chinese international arbitrators generally must allow 
nonparties to determine for themselves whether to cooperate with the 
arbitration process.  They will attempt to influence nonparties to participate, 
using institutional leverage when possible.  However, they are severely 
restricted by a lack of express power granted to them by either institutional 
rules or arbitration law to compel nonparties to cooperate. 
V. PRE-HEARING EVIDENCE DISCLOSURE CONTRIBUTES TO THE TIMELY 
AND EFFICIENT RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
Like rules in common law jurisdictions, CIETAC 2005 Rules permit 
pre-hearing evidence disclosure.  Institutions primarily set such rules 
because national arbitration laws rarely address the pre-hearing stage.  
During a preliminary hearing, arbitrators may settle numerous procedural 
issues such as the daily and weekly schedule, the extent and manner of 
witness examination, the privileges the tribunal will recognize, the order of 
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presentations, and other issues.177  Arbitrators also regularly collect lists of 
prospective witnesses.178  Furthermore, during the pre-hearing, arbitrators 
may also give the parties a list of legal questions that the tribunal determines 
are important for the parties to address.179 
This section examines the pre-hearing stage separately because of its 
significance to the timely and efficient resolution of disputes.180  One study 
suggests that when parties to litigation have a reasonable expectation of how 
the court will rule, the possibility of settlement is higher.181  By extension, if 
parties are able to obtain more information on the dispute prior to the actual 
hearing, the chance of settlement may also be higher in international 
arbitration.182  Pre-hearings are also useful procedurally for organizing the 
arbitration process and narrowing the issues at dispute. 
A. The CIETAC Pre-Hearing Evidence Collection Procedures Are More 
Similar to Those of Common Law Jurisdictions 
Pre-hearing evidence collection is practiced and explicitly permitted 
in arbitration institutions located in common law jurisdictions.  In contrast, 
civil law institutions are silent about pre-hearing evidence collection.  
CIETAC, in this aspect, mirrors arbitration institutions in common law 
jurisdictions because it expressly grants arbitrators the power to collect 
evidence during the pre-hearing stage. 
In common law jurisdictions, pre-hearing procedures are explicit and 
appear to be uniform across international arbitration institutions.  In 
Singapore, for example, SIAC arbitral tribunals can require parties to submit 
witness lists 183  and answer questions drafted by the arbitrators. 184   To 
increase efficiency and save time during the actual arbitral hearing, SIAC 
even mandates that the parties participate in two rounds of “Statement of 
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Evidence” exchanges.185  The London Center for International Arbitration 
similarly allows tribunals to collect lists of witnesses186 and pose pertinent 
questions to the parties.187  Although it is silent about pre-hearing arbitrator 
questions, the American Arbitration Association Rules expressly grant 
arbitrators the authority to “conduct a preparatory conference with the 
parties for the purpose of organizing, scheduling, and agreeing to procedures 
to expedite the subsequent proceedings.”188  The AAA Rules also allow the 
arbitrators to collect the names of witnesses before hearing the testimony.189 
The ICC and the German Arbitration Institute, however, are silent 
about the pre-hearing evidence collection powers of arbitrators.  The ICC 
requires that “Terms of Reference” be settled at the preliminary stages of 
arbitration.190  The ICC states that these Terms of Reference will be drawn 
up by the Arbitral Tribunal, and must include decisions on the place of 
arbitration, applicable procedural rules, claims and counterclaims, and other 
subjects.191  However, the purpose of the Terms of Reference is primarily 
organizational, providing arbitrators and parties with a way to gain more 
evidence. 
Provisions of the CIETAC 2005 Rules addressing an arbitrator’s 
power to collect evidence during the pre-hearing stage are similar to 
institutional rules in common law jurisdictions.  Article 29 explicitly permits 
arbitrators to “issue procedural directions and lists of questions, hold pre-
hearing meetings and preliminary hearings, and produce terms of reference, 
etc., unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”192  To increase party autonomy, 
Article 29 was amended with the phrase “unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties,” essentially giving the parties the power to make changes to the 
arbitration procedures, so long as both parties agree.193  The amendments 
also implemented other substantial changes to CIETAC 2005 Rules.194  Prior 
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to 2005, CIETAC’s rules were silent about pre-hearing meetings, even 
though the first hearings often functioned as such.195 
This departure from civil law custom is significant for Chinese 
international arbitration.  Pre-hearing meetings and evidence collection 
increase the efficiency and speed of arbitration proceedings because they 
reduce the number of disputed issues and procedurally organize the hearing.  
They may also increase the likelihood of settlement. 
B. Pre-Hearing Evidence Disclosures Are Rarely Used in Chinese 
International Arbitration 
Despite the ability to hold pre-hearing meetings to set procedural 
guidelines, exchange evidence between parties, and collect further evidence, 
CIETAC arbitrators in practice do not hold preliminary meetings.  Most 
CIETAC arbitrators are not accustomed to holding pre-hearing meetings.196  
When arbitrators do exercise the right to hold them, pre-hearing meetings 
usually only occur in complicated cases where the evidence proffered by the 
parties is complex and large in quantity.197  Kou Liyun, a CIETAC arbitrator, 
states, 
[w]hether a pre-hearing procedure may be adopted . . . depends 
on the facts of each case.  By virtue of the quantity and the 
complexity of evidences [sic] submitted, CIETAC arbitrators 
may set up a pre-hearing to make both parties clear [about 
which evidence will be presented and in what manner].198 
Normally, however, pre-hearing meetings are strictly procedural; they deal 
with setting deadlines and agreeing on which procedural rules should govern 
the arbitration. 199   Less complicated cases rarely involve solicitation of 
evidence by the arbitrators or opposing party. 
There are many reasons for the lack of pre-hearing meetings at 
CIETAC.  Arbitrators have the sole authority to determine whether to 
conduct a preliminary hearing,200 and as previously mentioned many are 
unaccustomed to holding such a hearing.  CIETAC domestic arbitration 
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cases cannot have pre-hearing meetings.201  The 2005 Rules expressly permit 
pre-hearings for international arbitrations, but this change is recent and time 
may be needed for awareness to expand.  Furthermore, the way arbitrators 
are compensated may play a role in the success of these proceedings.  
Because CIETAC arbitrators are remunerated in a single fee rather than paid 
by the hour, arbitrators may be less inclined to spend additional time and 
resources on pre-hearing matters as they will not receive extra compensation 
for that pre-hearing work.202  However, the payment scheme should not be a 
significant factor because pre-hearing meetings often help to narrow the 
focus of the arbitration and therefore decrease the time spent in an actual 
hearing, sometimes by an entire day or two.203 
Though not often used in practice, it is still important to note that pre-
hearing evidence collection is possible under CIETAC Rules.  CIETAC 
Secretariats believe preliminary meetings increase the efficiency and speed 
of arbitration. 204   Likewise, CIETAC arbitrators, especially those 
experienced in international arbitration, view pre-hearing meetings as 
beneficial to the arbitral process.205  Therefore, with the recent change in 
Rules, the use of pre-hearing meetings will likely increase dramatically in 
the near future.  Parties involved with arbitrations should not only be 
proactive in petitioning arbitrators to hold pre-hearing meetings to exchange 
evidence, but should also lobby arbitrators to use their powers to collect 
evidence prior to the hearing, including issuing lists of questions to the 
opposing party. 
VI. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES: PLANNING AHEAD 
Although this Article has illustrated that alternative courses can be 
taken when parties face the limitations on evidence disclosure in Chinese 
international arbitration, the most efficient and effective way to disclose 
evidence may be to contractually agree to it beforehand.206  An evidence 
disclosure clause can either be placed into an arbitration agreement or agreed 
upon in a pre-hearing conference. 207   Either form can determine the 
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procedural rules, the amount and types of documents that can be disclosed, 
and the time limits spent on evidence collection.208 
CIETAC 2005 Rules make the inclusion of a disclosure clause 
relatively easy because the rules stress party autonomy.  The new regulations 
allow the arbitral tribunal wide discretion to determine procedural rules such 
as choosing an inquisitorial or adversarial nature, setting pre-hearing 
meetings, and deciding terms of reference. 209   However, each of these 
arbitral powers is prefaced with “unless otherwise agreed by the parties,” 
which essentially gives parties the ability to conduct the arbitration as they 
wish.210  In fact, the parties can agree to use other institutional rules rather 
than CIETAC Rules.211  For example, parties can agree to use a common law 
institutional rule if they prefer more liberal evidence disclosure rules. 
One set of rules that parties can contractually agree to use is the 
International Bar Association’s Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration (“IBA Rules”).  The IBA Rules were meant to 
provide “mechanisms for the presentation of documents, witnesses of fact, 
expert witnesses and inspections, as well as for the conduct of evidentiary 
hearings.”212  Shortly after their adoption and publication in 1999, the IBA 
Rules or similar rules were implemented in practically all major 
international arbitrations. 213   The popularity of the IBA Rules can be 
attributed to the fact that they bridge the procedural gap between common 
law and civil law jurisdictions.214  Though the IBA Rules generally grant 
disclosure powers to arbitrators, these powers are tightly restricted, 
reassuring parties and lawyers who are accustomed to civil law practices.215 
The IBA Rules provision for compelling nonparty disclosure provides 
an example of a compromise between different legal practices.  In Article 3, 
relating to documents, the IBA Rules state that “if a party wishes to obtain 
the production of documents from a person or organization who is not a 
Party to the arbitration and from whom the Party cannot obtain the 
documents on its own, the Party may . . . ask [the Tribunal] to take whatever 
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steps are legally available to obtain the requested documents.”216  However, 
the request must be limited to those documents that the party knows exist.217  
A party must be able to “identify the documents in sufficient detail and state 
why such documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the 
case.”218  Article 4 of the IBA Rules states that the Arbitral Tribunal may 
take whatever legally permissible steps it sees fit in order to obtain the 
testimony of a nonparty that is unwilling to voluntarily present evidence.219  
The party seeking to force the testimony of an uncooperative nonparty must 
identify the witness, describe the subjects of the testimony sought and state 
why testimony is relevant.220  These restrictions ensure that discovery does 
not become a “fishing expedition,” which can, and often does, occur in 
common law jurisdictions.  Similar defenses and restrictions exist for parties 
who seek to protect themselves from the more invasive common law 
jurisdiction disclosure procedures.221 
However, even where parties agree beforehand that they will use an 
institutional rule that permits forced disclosure, arbitrators may still be tied 
by the Chinese Arbitration Law.  By agreeing to expand CIETAC 2005 
Rules or substitute those rules with another institution’s rules, the parties can 
bypass the limitations and weaknesses of CIETAC’s evidence disclosure 
rules.  However, true sanctioning power will still be absent due to the 
wording of CAL.222  Article 4(2) of CIETAC 2005 Rules states that the 
“parties’ agreement shall prevail except where such agreement is inoperative 
or in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law of the place of 
arbitration.”223   As previously mentioned, CAL provides no guidance in 
regard to compelling parties and nonparties of evidence disclosure.  
Therefore, even if the parties’ agreement is not “in conflict” with the 
mandatory provisions of CAL, the arbitral tribunal is not able to rely on 
CAL to seek court assistance, except when preserving evidence or property.  
Whereas under the FAA parties and nonparties can be compelled to attend or 
held in contempt of court,224 there is no punishment under CAL for parties 
and nonparties who do not cooperate with the arbitral tribunal’s orders.  The 
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Chinese Arbitration Law must, thus, be amended to provide arbitrators with 
the ability to seek Chinese court assistance in collecting evidence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Chinese international arbitration law limits the arbitrator’s authority to 
compel the disclosure of evidence.  Arbitrators are not able to compel parties 
to disclose evidence, nor can they ask nonparties to produce documents or to 
testify.  However, CIETAC arbitrators may collect evidence during the pre-
hearing stage.  Unfortunately, this practice is rarely used.  Despite these 
setbacks, there are alternative steps that parties and arbitrators can take.  
Parties may petition the Chinese courts to require the preservation of 
evidence, which thus places the desired evidence under court supervision for 
the arbitrators to freely inspect.  Similarly, arbitrators can exercise their right 
to draw an adverse inference from an uncooperative or unresponsive party 
and render an award against that party.  Arbitrators may also use CIETAC’s 
institutional name and influence to persuade nonparties to cooperate with the 
arbitration process. 
Although these options may potentially be used to obtain desired 
evidence, it is a far more efficient and prudent option for parties to agree 
beforehand on the extent of the arbitrator’s evidence disclosure powers.  The 
new CIETAC 2005 Rules promote this method by emphasizing party 
autonomy and allowing parties to adopt a different set of evidentiary rules.  
The trend in China regarding international arbitration is moving toward an 
increase in party autonomy and a more balanced approach to evidence 
disclosure procedures.  Chinese lawmakers have incorporated aspects of 
both civil and common law arbitration procedures in an attempt to strike a 
balance.  The rules neither permit broad, resource- and time-consuming 
evidence disclosure, nor deny all requests for compelling disclosure of 
evidence necessary for a just arbitral award. 
